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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Justin Samuel Goetsch pleaded guilty to one 
count of sexual abuse of a child. The district court imposed a unified sentence of 25 
years, with 15 years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Goetsch asserts that: (1) the district court 
violated his right to due process by punishing him for exercising his constitutional right 
to conflict-free counsel at government expense; (2) the district court abused its 
discretion when it imposed his sentence because it used, as a factor in sentencing, the 
fact that appointment of conflict counsel cost the county additional money; (3) the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion because there was new information presented that was 
misinterpreted and not adequately considered; and (4) the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On November 13, 2011, Jacob Bateman, the victim's brother, informed Jerome 
police Officer Clayton that he had found a note written by the victim (hereinafter, R.M.) 
that said Mr. Goetsch wanted to "get down her pants." (Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.8.)1 Mr. Bateman also stated that the note said that R.M. 
was concerned that if she reported the incident that prompted her to write the note, 
Mr. Goetsch would rape her. (PSI, p.8.) Shortly thereafter, Officer Clayton went to 
R.M.'s residence to speak with her and confirmed her date of birth as 
meaning R.M. had just turned sixteen. (PSI, p.8.) Mr. Goetsch and R.M.'s 
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mother (Jenny Bateman), who was Mr. Goetsch's fiance, were also living at the 
residence. (PSI. p.8.) R.M. admitted that she wrote the note after an incident that took 
place over a year earlier. (PSI, p.8.) She told the officer that sometime between late 
September 2010 and the end of October of 2010, she and Mr. Goetsch were watching a 
movie together on a couch when Mr. Goetsch "began rubbing around her genitals." 
(PSI, p.8.) She said that her mother walked in the room at th-at point, and Mr. Goetsch 
stopped, but she was concerned that if her mother had not walked in the room, 
Mr. Goetsch may have gone further. (PSI, p.8.) R.M. said she told her mother about 
the incident and her mother confronted Mr. Goetsch about it. (PSI, p.8.) R.M. also said 
no further incidents had occurred in the ensuing year. (PSI, p.8.) 
When Officer Clayton contacted Mr. Goetsch, Mr. Goetsch admitted that he had 
made a terrible mistake and touched R.M. in the genital area under her shorts. (PSI, 
p.8.) Subsequently, Mr. Bateman gave Officer Clayton R.M's note and told him that he 
had a recording of a conversation between himself and Jenny Bateman where she said 
that she knew what had occurred and said it was wrong but felt that it was handled in a 
way that was better than Mr. Goetsch going to prison. (PSI, p.8.) 
Mr. Goetsch was arrested and charged with one count of lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen years of age, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-1508 and one count of 
sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-
1506(1)(a) and/or (b). (R., pp.87-90.) Additionally, the State sought a persistent 
violator enhancement based on the fact that Mr. Goetsch had once been convicted of 
similar offenses. (R., pp.87-90.) 
1 All page cites to the PSI and its exhibits refer to the 89-page electronic document 
entitled "41359 State v. Goetsch Confidential Exhibits." 
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Initially, Mr. Goetsch considered going to trial and, apparently in one of his 
meetings with his public defender (Stacey DePew), he discussed a potential trial 
strategy with Ms. DePew that could have implicated one of Ms. Depew's former clients 
in another crime; therefore, Ms. DePew moved to withdraw. Apparently because the 
district court initially refused to let her withdraw,2 Ms. DePew filed an affidavit under seal 
with the district court in support of her motion. (PSI, pp.2-5.) In that affidavit, 
Ms. DePew went into detail about a previous discussion with Mr. Goetsch's family and 
explained a potential trial strategy in some detail to the district court. (PSI, p.4.) She 
explained that Mr. Goetsch's family had hired a private investigator and that the 
investigator and Jenny Bateman had come to believe that R.M.'s allegations "were false 
and stemmed not from the defendant's conduct, but rather the alleged rape of the 
alleged victim by an individual who has been a client of counsel's .... " (PSI, p.2.) 
Ms. Depew attempted to clarify this potential defense as follows: 
The defense which is to be proffered to the Jury involves accusing 
counsel's former client of rape of the alleged victim in the defendant's 
above-entitled case. The defense is that the rape by the former client of 
counsel is what caused the alleged victim in this case to make false 
allegations against the defendant and that the defendant is not guilty of 
lewd conduct. 
(PSI, p.4.) Despite this detail, the potential defense strategy was not entirely clear. The 
most logical interpretation, however, is that the strategy would focus on the fact that the 
trauma from the rape affected R.M. in a way that caused her to falsely accuse 
Mr. Goetsch of touching her and would potentially explain why she was fearful that 
Mr. Goetsch would rape her if she told anyone about the touching. 
2 Section 11 of Ms. Depew's affidavit suggests that the district court initially refused to 
allow Ms. DePew to withdraw. It states "'[d]espite the court's impression that the conflict 
merely involves questioning the character of the alleged victim through a prior client, the 
conflict here is much deeper .... " (PSI, p.4.) 
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Once it became clear that there was a potential conflict, but apparently before 
Mr. Goetsch made a final decision as to whether to go to trial on the scheduled date or 
accept a plea offer, Ms. DePew thought it best to withdraw, and Mr. Goetsch agreed. 
This would require a continuance, but Mr. Goetsch said he would be willing to waive his 
rights to a speedy trial, and that he "would be more comfortable with a lawyer who did 
not have a conflict of interest." (PSI, p.5.) Conflict counsel was appointed soon 
thereafter. (R., p.64.) 
Mr. Goetsch eventually chose not to go to trial and, instead, to accept a plea 
agreement; he pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of 
sixteen years. (Tr. 4/9/12, p.19, Ls.12-17.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss 
the other charges. (Tr. 4/9/12, p.13, Ls.7-17.) At the sentencing hearing, the State 
recommended a unified sentence of 25 years, with 10 years fixed. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.31, 
Ls.22-25.) Mr. Goetsch's counsel requested that the district court retain jurisdiction so 
that Mr. Goetsch could participate in sex offender treatment and then, upon his 
successful completion of that treatment, take part in community-based treatment. 
(Tr. 6/25/12, p.37, Ls.9-17.) 
Based in part on the fact that Mr. Goetsch's crime "resulted in additional cost to 
the county" because of the necessity to appoint conflict counsel, the district court 
exceeded the State's recommendation and imposed a unified sentence of 25 years, 
with 15 years fixed. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.10-13, R., p.112, Tr. 6/25/12, p.42, Ls.7-9.) 
The district court said that it noted that "during the pendency of this action it was 
necessary to appoint a conflict public defender because of assertions, either by you or 
other family members, that perhaps there was another person who committed this 
crime." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.4-9.) 
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Mr. Goetsch filed a timely Rule 35 motion based on new information in the form 
of an affidavit from Jenny Bateman. (R., pp.130-133.) Her affidavit addressed the 
district court's conclusion that there were assertions made that another person 
committed the crime. (See R., pp.132-133.) Ms. Bateman said that at no point did she 
"ever say or insinuate to Ms. DePew that this third person had committed the crime 
against my daughter for which the defendant has pied guilty in this matter." (R., p.133.) 
This obviously supported the conclusion that the district court misinterpreted the trial 
strategy. Nevertheless, the motion was denied by the district court. (R., pp.135-137.) 
In its order to that effect, the district court stated that "Ms. Bateman claims in her 
affidavit that she never told or insinuated to Ms. DePew that this other man is the man 
who actually committed the rape for which the defendant is accused." (R., p.137.) 
However, Mr. Goetsch was never accused of rape. Further, the district court went on to 
incorrectly say that Ms. Bateman's statement was, 
in direct conflict with the affidavit of counsel filed under seal in support of 
her motion to withdraw as counsel for the defendant. When the court 
granted the motion to withdraw it was clear that the defendant and the 
family of the victim were claiming that the allegations of the victim as to 
the defendant were false. The defendant requests that this Court grant 
him leniency because he has presented information to evidence that he 
did not attempt to blame a third party for his crime. Such a claim is not 
supported by the record, sealed or otherwise that was the basis to allow 
prior counsel to withdraw. 
(R., p.137.) 
In the meantime, Mr. Goetsch filed a notice of appeal that was timely from 
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.124-126.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Goetsch's right to due process by increasing his 
sentence because he exercised his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel at 
government expense? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it considered, as a factor in 
sentencing, Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his constitutional right to conflict-free 
counsel which cost the county additional money? 
3. In light of the affidavit from Jenny Bateman that directly addressed and 
discredited a factor that the district court considered at sentencing, did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 Motion? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
25 years, with 15 years fixed, following Mr. Goetsch's plea of guilty to sexual 




The District Court Violated Mr. Goetsch's Right To Due Process By Increasing His 
Sentence Because He Exercised His Constitutional Right To Conflict-Free Counsel At 
Government Expense 
Every defendant has a constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. ''The right to 
conflict-free representation derives from the S.ixth Amendment as applied to the states 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 
784, 791 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932); State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003)). And of course the United States Supreme Court 
has stated emphatically that the right to representation applies to indigents and those 
with means alike. 
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws 
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards 
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every 
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized 
if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a 
lawyer to assist him. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
Also, because Mr. Goetsch is an indigent defendant, the district court's 
consideration of his exercise of his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel and the 
resulting cost to the county also implicates equal protection issues. 
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an 
age old problem .... Both equal protection and due process emphasize 
the central aim of our entire judicial system - all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, "stand on an equality before 
the bar of justice in every American court." 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1956) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). 
Further, a long line of United States Supreme Court cases make it clear that no 
defendant can be punished for exercising a constitutional right. "[W]hile an individual 
certainly may be penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly may not be 
punished for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right." United States v. 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982). These cases also leave no doubt that such 
punishment is a violation of due process. "To punish a person because he has done 
what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort .. 
. . " Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); accord North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 
(1989); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
Although none of these cases speak to Mr. Goetsch's exact situation because 
they address prosecutorial or judicial vindictiveness, their broad admonitions certainly 
apply here. And the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the "right to be free from 
vindictive sentencing" constitutes a fundamental error that can be reviewed for the first 
time on appeal, "because it would go to the foundation or basis of [the defendant's] 
rights." State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 530 (1993). Therefore, other violations of due 
process at sentencing would constitute fundamental error, which can be considered on 
appeal even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. 
The Robbins decision was prior to the Court's recent clarification of fundamental 
error in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). After Perry, this Court applies a three-part 
test to determine whether an error is fundamental: (1) whether the alleged error violates 
an unwaived constitutional right; (2) whether the error is plain and obvious from the 
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; 
and, (3) whether the defendant can establish that the error affected the outcome of the 
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proceedings. Id. at 226. Here, the district court's use of Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his 
constitutional rights as an aggravating factor in sentencing satisfies this test. 
First, Mr. Goetsch never waived his right to due process at his sentencing 
hearing. Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record; the district court said 
that it was considering the fact that it was necessary to appoint a conflict public 
defender because of "assertions by you or other family members, that perhaps there 
was another person who committed this crime,"3 and that the resultant cost to the 
county of that appointment was a "a factor, but a very minor factor for the court to 
consider." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.4-13.) And finally, whether it was minor or not, the 
district court obviously considered it to be an aggravating factor that should have 
increased Mr. Goetsch's sentence, and thus it affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
Therefore, it was fundamental error. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Considered, As A Factor In 
Sentencing, Mr. Goetsch's Exercise Of His Constitutional Right To Conflict-Free 
Counsel Which Cost The County Additional Money 
In reviewing an exercise of discretion, an appellate Court considers "(1) whether 
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho 
Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991). 
3 This appears to have been a misunderstanding of the potential trial strategy. Although 
that misunderstanding is largely irrelevant for this issue, it is certainly relevant to the 
Rule 35 discussion below. 
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The factors that a district court may consider at sentencing are well-established. 
"[A] term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary, at the time of 
sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
case." State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). Additionally, district courts 
may consider the criteria specified in I.C. § 19-2521, which codify the Toohi/1 factors in 
large part and also illuminate potential mitigating factors. However, there is no case law 
or statute that indicates that the district court may consider the cost of conflict-free 
representation for an indigent defendant as an aggravating factor. And this is also 
clearly improper under Goodwin. 
Here, at Mr. Goetsch's sentencing hearing, the district court referenced these 
standard sentencing factors when it said that "protection of society is this court's primary 
concern." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.39, Ls.8-9.) It went on to reference I.C. § 19-2521 and also 
said that it considers "the character of the offender, the nature of the underlying offense, 
as well as defendant's prior record." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.39, Ls.16-18. However, it then 
pointed out that "it was necessary to appoint a conflict public defender because of the 
assertions, either by you or other family members, that perhaps there was another 
person who committed this crime." (Tr. 6/25/13, p.41, Ls.5-9.) This seems to be a 
misunderstanding of the potential trial strategy that was submitted under seal in 
Ms. DePew's affidavit. But much more importantly, the district court went on to say that, 
due to the appointment of conflict counsel "the defense of this crime has resulted in 
additional cost to the county. That is a factor, but a very minor factor for the court to 
consider." (Tr. 6/25/14, p.41, Ls.10-13.) Whether it was a minor factor or not is 
irrelevant. It should never have been considered at all. 
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The district court correctly perceived that Mr. Goetsch's sentencing was within 
the trial court's discretion. However, considering this factor in any way when fashioning 
an appropriate sentence punished Mr. Goetsch for exercising his constitutionally 
guaranteed right to conflict-free counsel. In other words, considering Mr. Goetsch's 
exercise of his constitutional right and the resulting extra cost to the county as a factor 
in sentencing was not within the outer boundaries of the district court's discretion and 
was not a choice available to it. Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion. 
111. 
In Light Of The Affidavit From Jenny Bateman That Directly Addressed And Discredited 
A Factor That The District Court Improperly Considered At Sentencing, The District 
Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 Motion 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which can be 
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested 
leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence 
was reasonable." Id. However, if the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant can later show that it is excessive in light of new information presented 
with the motion for reduction. Id. 
Here, Mr. Goetsch provided new information in the form of an affidavit from 
Jenny Bateman. (R., pp.132-133.) The affidavit directly addressed the 
misunderstanding and resulting prejudice generated by the details and potential trial 
strategy that Ms. DePew included in her affidavit, and the fact that the court relied on 
that misunderstanding at sentencing as discussed above. 
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It is clear from the order denying the Rule 35 that the district court misinterpreted 
the purpose of Ms. Bateman's affidavit because the district court was obviously under 
the impression that the potential trial strategy involved a plan to have Mr. Goetsch claim 
that someone else committed the crime of touching R.M. That is not a reasonable 
interpretation of the statements in Ms. DePew's affidavit. And the district court's 
confusion on this entire issue is borne out in a number of its statements. First, the 
district court stated in its order denying the motion that "Ms. Bateman claims in her 
affidavit that she never told or insinuated to Ms. DePew that this other man is the man 
who actually committed the rape for which the defendant is accused." (R., p.137.) 
Mr. Goetsch was never accused of rape. 
This may have been a simple mistake on the part of the district court, but it 
supports the conclusion that the district court failed to adequately consider the 
relationship between the two affidavits. It also supports the conclusion that, either due 
to a misreading or due to the somewhat ambiguous nature of Ms. DePew's language in 
her affidavit, the district court failed to understand the nuance of the potential trial 
strategy. However, as discussed above, this never should have been considered at 
sentencing in the first place, and then Ms. Bateman's affidavit would never have been 
necessary. 
Mr. Goetsch never denied committing this crime. Indeed, he admitted to Officer 
Clayton immediately that he touched R.M. Moreover, he never went to trial and denied 
committing the crime. He certainly considered trying to deny it in his meetings with his 
attorney, but this information should never have been used against him; considering 
different approaches prior to making a final decision about going to trial or pleading is 
obviously typical in any serious case. And here, it actually appears as though the trial 
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strategy was the idea of Ms. Bateman and her private investigator. There is no 
indication that Mr. Goetsch was pushing for this approach. The fact that he eventually 
pied guilty supports this conclusion. 
Moreover, it is apparent from the statements of Ms. DePew that even if he had 
tried to deny that he committed the crime at trial, he would not have claimed someone 
else committed it. He would have argued that the rape of R.M. by a different person 
resulted in trauma that created mental issues for R.M., and that trauma caused her to 
falsely accuse Mr. Goetsch of touching her or created a fear that she might be raped by 
him if she reported the incident. Therefore, Ms. Bateman's affidavit was certainly not in 
"direct conflict" with Ms. DePew's affidavit but actually showed that the sentence was 
excessive. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 35. 
Of course all of this could have been avoided if the district court had allowed 
Ms. DePew to withdraw initially, or, in the alternative, allowed her to withdraw after she 
submitted her affidavit under seal and then proceeded without further disclosure or 
consideration of the content of the affidavit. Instead, the district court used the 
information under seal in sentencing and in its order on the Rule 35. Every client has a 
right to consult with his attorney about his options prior to a final decision as to whether 
to accept a plea offer or go to trial. But the district court seemed displeased with this 
development, and this led to a violation of Mr. Goetsch's right to due process and an 
abuse of discretion. All of these errors could have been remedied by the district court 
with relief under Rule 35. 
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IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 25 
Years, With 15 Years Fixed, Following Mr. Goetsch's Plea Of Guilty To Sexual Abuse 
Of A Child 
Even if this Court finds that the district court's consideration of an improper 
aggravating factor was not a due process violation or an abuse of discretion, the district 
still abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. Mr. Goetsch's unified 
sentence of 25 years, with 15 years fixed, is excessive because it is not necessary to 
achieve the goals of sentencing. When there is a claim that the sentencing court 
imposed an excessive sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent 
examination of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the 
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 
103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). Here, there are multiple mitigating factors that 
indicate that Mr. Goetsch's character was not adequately considered by the district 
court. 
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). When a 
sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982). Unless it appears that confinement was 
necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
case," a sentence is unreasonable. State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 
1982). Accordingly, if the sentence is excessive, "under any reasonable view of the 
facts," because it is not necessary to achieve these goals, it is unreasonable and 
therefore an abuse of discretion. Id. 
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There is a great deal of mitigating information that supports the conclusion that 
Mr. Goetsch's sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. First of 
all, Mr. Goetsch was sexually abused as a child. (See PSI, pp.58, 80.) Apparently his 
sister, who was sixteen years old at the time, engaged in intercourse, on seven 
separate occasions, with Mr. Goetsch when he was only eight years old. (PSI, p.80.) 
This is mentioned only briefly in a sex offender risk assessment and evaluation 
conducted in 2004 and then only as part of a chart detailing his sexual experiences in 
the psychosexual evaluation performed in 2012. (PSI, pp.58, 80.) The chart indicates 
that this behavior was "consensual." That is difficult to believe. But it is even more 
disconcerting that neither psychosexual evaluator delved more deeply into this issue 
during the evaluations. Based on such cursory coverage of this issue, it is not 
surprising that the district court did not give adequate consideration to this information. 
Further, Mr. Goetsch has significant mental health issues that were not 
adequately considered. He suffers from depressive disorder and attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. (PSI, p.54.) He was originally diagnosed with this 
disorder when he was 6 years old, and he was put on medication at that time. (PSI, 
p.53; Tr. 6/25/12, p.34, Ls.1-3.) In his mental health evaluation, he said he has always 
struggled with school and with paying attention because he is "always on the move." 
(PSI, p.50, p.53.) Indeed, Mr. Goetsch's counsel noted that Mr. Goetsch, because of 
financial reasons, was not on his medication when he committed the instant offense, or 
when he violated his parole for his previous offense. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.34, Ls.7-11.) His 
counsel stated that Mr. Goetsch had "a history of acting out and impulsivity, and when 
he is not on his Ritalin, and that certainly was the fact surrounding his involvement in 
this crime." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.34, Ls.12-15.) 
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Additionally, Mr. Goetsch showed great remorse for this crime. When he was 
confronted by Officer Clayton, he said he had made a "terrible mistake." (PSI, p.8.) 
And, in speaking about the crime, he said "I have no excuse for my actions, I destroyed 
my family and ruined the relationship that I had with a wonderful young lady I saw as my 
daughter. I can still see and feel the lack of trust in her eyes and her actions every time 
I think about it and can do nothing to change it. I was wrong and hurt everyone I loved." 
(PSI, p.10.) This remorse was also evidenced by the fact that he lived with R.M. for 
another year after the incident and never touched her again. (See PSI, pp.87-88.) 
Mr. Goetsch also cooperated throughout the entire PSI process and told the truth 
about what happened. In the PSI, he said that he "rubbed her pelvic area adjacent to 
her hip." (PSI, p.10.) Also, he told the psychosexual evaluator that he never touched 
her vagina. (PSI, p.82.) He agreed to take a polygraph and passed that test when he 
answered no when asked if he had ever touched R.M. on the breasts, if he had any 
further sexual contact with her beyond the one incident, and if he had touched her 
vagina. (PSI, pp.87-88.) Moreover, the psychosexual evaluator said he was 
"forthcoming and engaged meaningfully in the evaluation process," and that "[h]e did not 
at any time express attitudes that condone or excuse sexual offending," and "he has 
accepted full responsibility for his behavior." (PSI, p.83.) 
Another mitigating factor that the district court failed to adequately consider is the 
fact that Mr. Goetsch's first sexual offense occurred when he was 18, and he was in a 
long-term consensual relationship with a 14-year-old. From the PSI, it is evident that 
this was a mutual and loving relationship. (See PSI, pp.58, 79.) Indeed, Mr. Goetsch 
was actually living with the girl and her mother for a short period, and her mother 
apparently approved of the relationship because the three of them had even spoken 
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about a marriage between them when the victim in that case turned 16. (Tr. 6/25/12, 
p.32, Ls.22-25 - p.33, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Goetsch's counsel spoke to the nature of this 
relationship at the sentencing hearing and said that such a case would not have been 
prosecuted in the same way in this day and age. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.33, Ls.5-13.) In other 
words, he would not have been convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct and sexual 
abuse of a child. The district court never acknowledged the nature of this relationship 
when it discussed Mr. Goetsch's first offense at sentencing; it simply said that this was 
Mr. Goetsch's "second sex crime." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.14-15.) 
Given all the mitigating information in this case, Mr. Goetsch's sentence is 
excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing outlined in 
Toohi/1. If Mr. Goetsch was put on a rider, he could get the kind of effective treatment 
he needs, and society would be protected because if he was not successful on his rider, 
he would face a significant prison sentence. This would also serve as a strong 
deterrent. Further, as Mr. Goetsch's counsel pointed out at the sentencing hearing, 
Mr. Goetsch is not a predator. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.34, Ls.23-25 - p.35, Ls.1-3.) He made a 
serious mistake, but he realized just how serious it was and never did anything further in 
the following year. His polygraph results support this. (PSI, pp.87-88.) In other words, 
it was not an ongoing problem that would support the idea that he posed a serious 
danger to society. A shorter fixed term or a rider would still ensure that there was 
significant retribution for the crime. But most importantly, it would give Mr. Goetsch a 
chance at meaningful rehabilitation and ensure that Mr. Goetsch is able to deal 
effectively with his mental health issues and discover how those can be treated 
effectively so something like this would never happen again. 
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As it stands now, Mr. Goetsch will not have a chance to get out of prison until he 
is 50 years old. This was a serious offense, but society would certainly be better-served 
if Mr. Goetsch could get treatment and move on to become a productive citizen instead 
of being a burden on society. And certainly this offense did not call for a greater 
sentence than the State recommended. Given the facts of this case, Mr. Goetsch's 
extended sentence was not necessary and was thei:efore unreasonable and an abuse 
of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Goetsch respectfully requests that his case be remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing in front of a different district court. Alternatively, he requests that 
this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 18th day of December, 2013. 
I 
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REED P. ANDE1is N 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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